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Abstract
The pursuit of happiness always involves a paradox. This ar-
ticle begins by examining the concept of happiness and the para-
dox of happiness in Western economics and shows how the para-
dox of happiness is never overcome. The paper then examines
the Buddhist idea of happiness. In Buddhism, happiness is ex-
plained with regard to how it arises in the human mind. In Bud-
dhism to avoid the paradox of happiness and its attendant suffer-
ing is to change our views and attitude about happiness and about
the pursuit of happiness.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Happiness, has been a central philosophical theme since the time
of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Happiness has always involved suffer-
ing in its pursuit. As long as we are attached to its pursuit, we will never
achieve it. In Buddhism this is known as the paradox of happiness, and
this insight goes against the thought of many modern economists, phi-
losophers, and thinkers.
Pursuing it means that we have already made it impossible be-
cause to get happiness does not work that way. To pursue is to desire or
crave. The right thought taught by the Awakened One of Buddhism is a
‘letting go’ of desire or craving. Whether we ‘try’ to suppress desire or
just pursue desire, we remain bound to desire and suffering. But, in the
state of mindfulness (or attentive awareness), we begin to see happiness
or our happy feelings as it is actually taking place and vanishing. Then,
we can let go of the cause of our suffering (dukkha)__by seeing how it
actually is__this frees the mind to attain happiness.
_____________________________
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That view in economics concerning happiness is complex. The
pursuit of happiness in association with economics seems to directly
contradict the essence of the Buddhist teachings. Many people in the
developed world seem to think that they can only become happy if they
fulfill their desires. Their lives involve the pusuit of money. Easterlin
(1974) finds that happiness in advanced countries such as USA, UK, or
Japan is not confined to economic affluence. But, a recent study reveals
that the paradox of happiness refers to ‘two different empirical data’-in
the short term, richer people are on average happier than poorer ones,
but in long term, a society does not become happier as it became richer.
The question is what is the reason for this paradox?
The answer is complex and there is no single explanation. This
article investigates how far the Western economics and Buddhism can
explain the paradox of happiness regarding those ‘two different empiri-
cal data’. Then, I develop a Buddhist perspective on the paradox of hap-
piness.
2.  A WESTERN UNDERSTANDING OF HAPPINESS
In the Western world, there are assorted concepts which charac-
terize ‘happiness’. Some concepts are not related to each other (e.g.,
eudaimonia, ataraxia, beatitodo, and utility); some are reduced or de-
rived from one another (e.g., welfare or well-being is derived from choices
or preference-satisfaction, and preference-satisfaction is relied on util-
ity, and utility is hinged on pleasure and pain); but all concepts are vari-
ous forms of an entity called ‘happiness’. In short, the idea of happiness
can be traced back to the ancient Greeks in the 4th century B.C., ranging
from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle through Hume1 and Smith down to
Marx (1875), Bentham (1789), J.S. Mill (1863), and Kahneman (1997).
Eudaimonia, a Greek word for ‘happiness’ (or ‘flourishing’) where
‘virtue’ or ‘excellence’ is centred, is first discussed by Socrates (c. 469-
399 B.C.) in the Euthydemus (Eu III.278e-282e) where he contends that
humans want to be happy. Later, Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.), in his theory
of eudaimonia, written in 350 B.C., describes eudaimonia as the life of
virtuous activities that takes pleasure in their own virtues (NE X.7/284-
7). Up to the Hellenistic Era (4th-1st centuries B.C.), happiness is viewed
as ataraxia (tranquility); but in the Medieval Era (5th-15th centuries), hap-
piness conception is shifted to be beatitudo or the perfect happiness__it is
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heavenly happiness which would be granted by God in heaven afterlife;
then happiness is gold pursuing concerning the Mercantilism (16th-17th
century); since 18th-19th centuries, happiness is perceived as public hap-
piness (18th-19th centuries)__including the ideas of ‘wealth of the nations’
of the classical economics, ‘benevolence’ of the socialist utopian such as
Rousseau (1782), or Turgot (1727-1781 C.E.) who suggested the idea
that the laws must contribute to public happiness and the government
should endeavour to allow thriving of individual freedom rather than “to
always immolate the happiness of the private individuals”;2 and the com-
munism of Marx (1875: 10); up to the late 18th century, happiness is
utility and welfare; and preference-well-being of the new welfare eco-
nomics (20th to present). For our contemporary, happiness is the ‘con-
spicuous consumption’ or being an ‘icon’. Besides, there are no morals
involving in it (utility), and it cannot be the directive rule of human con-
duct.
Although the Western economics concept of happiness borrows
from powerful approaches related to psychology and individual utility to
understand social well-being, it conflates happiness with desire. It is re-
lated to each individual’s pursuit, and not for the society as a whole. As a
result, happiness from the Western perspective holds “no possible defi-
nition”, or it is presumably an indefinable concept according to philoso-
phers such as Hobbes (Le I.11.1), Kant (1785: 12, 27), and Hegel (1830:
396). Later the summum bonum, is what Bentham (1789), James Mill,
and J.S. Mill hoped to settle via the power of the Principle of Utility or
quantitative hedonism __ the general acceptance of utilitarianism (Mill,
1863: 113-9).
3.  THE PARADOX OF HAPPINESS
This concept can be traced back to the 19th-century philosophy as
the “paradox of hedonism” or the “pleasure paradox”. J.S. Mill (1989:
117) was the first to point out that to interpret happiness as the goal of
life is paradoxical, as he says, “But I now thought that this end was only
to be attained by not making it the direct end”. Sidgwick (1874: 24)
continues to develop this paradox of happiness, by saying, “It is true of
some pleasures of the merely animal life, as well as of the satisfactions
of a good conscience, that they can be obtained only if they are not di-
rectly sought”. He means that pleasure cannot be acquired directly; it can
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only be acquired indirectly. It is not until much later that the idea is de-
veloped further. Easterlin began studying the empirical data on the na-
tional happiness and raised the paradox of happiness in his 1974 article.
The paradox becomes known as Easterlin’s paradox and has been used
as a starting-point of a new study called the Economics of Happiness.
3.1  Paradox of Happiness: A Western Economic View
A ‘paradox’ means a phenomenon or idea that is opposite to com-
mon sense, hypothesis, expectation, belief of general people, or the truth.
By the paradox of happiness, it means “the decrease in happiness in a
rising (or advancing) economy”. In this article, however, it refers only to
the happiness-income paradox.
3.1.1  Empirical Evidence
The early empirical studies which contributed to this paradoxical
claim and which gained wide acceptance in the recent economics of hap-
piness are Easterlin (1974); Scitovsky (1976); and Smith (1979). Unfor-
tunately, their works have remained unknown to mainstream economists
for years. Today, the paradox of happiness is described by two facts
(Layard et al., 2012: 60-6). Fact 1: happiness and income have positive
relationship with each other in short run, (Figure 1). Fact 2: there is a
Figure 1: Happiness-Income Cross-sectional Relationship in the
U.S.1972-2004
Source: Layard et al., 2007 (revised January 2008), p. 11. (cited from the US
General Social Survey 1972-2004)
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happiness-income paradox in long run (Figure 2). The Easterlin paradox
refers to Fact 2__the time-series evidence shows ‘no relation between
income and happiness’ which means “getting richer does not make a
nation (an individual) happier in the long-run”.
Most economists and researchers accept ‘Fact 1’ as ‘correct’ for
income always emerges as a factor explaining the variation in life satis-
faction (happiness) within a country. But, ‘Fact 2’ is controversial and
much debated.
3.1.2  The Western Explanation of the Paradox of Happiness
The explanations of this paradox are many. But in this paper two
basic economic theories will be applied: The LDMUI and RIH.
The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income (LDMUI)
represents societies that are affluent and where individuals can satiate
their material needs, by purchasing what they want. But as the society
becomes wealthier, any additional income they have can buy less and
less happiness (Layard et al. 2008; Oswald 2012) since economic growth
cannot increase happiness beyond a certain level once basic needs are
fulfilled. In other words, when a country has satisfied its material needs
and with plenty kinds of products and services, there is a law of dimin-
ishing returns.
Figure 2: Happiness and Real Income Per Capita in the US,
1973-2004
Source and notes: Clark et al., 2008, p. 96.  Happiness is the average reply
to the following question: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these
days? Would you say that you are…?” The responses are coded as (3) Very Happy, (2)
Pretty Happy, and (1) Not too Happy. Happiness data are drawn from the General
Social Survey.
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The Relative Income Hypothesis (RIH) refers to the tendency of
people to compare their income or consumption to others. Duesenberry
(1949) examines and tests consumption behavior based on a hypothesis
that “people usually compare themselves to others; so their consumption
functions are influenced by the difference between their level of income
and the others”. Today, people’s reported level of happiness in advanced
countries such as the United States rests on their own income (absolute
income) and also how their income compares to their peers (relative in-
come). The latter has more influence in determining their happiness. Also,
as income continues to grow, it could promote an ongoing consumption
race__‘keeping up with the Joneses’3 (Layard 2010, Clark & Senik 2010).
This causes the level of income and consumption to increase greatly,
while average (or total) happiness does not.
Furthermore, a recent research by Princeton University research-
ers reveals that people also compare their income to some level of refer-
ence. In this study it was about $75,000 a year (Luscombe, 2010). The
lower the person’s annual income was below this reference, the unhap-
pier the person felt, because it made them feel weighed down by the
problems they already have. But, at $75,000, this effect disappeared be-
cause they care for relative income. However, no matter how much people
make above $75,000, it didn’t make them happier, although they felt
their life was going well. This means that when each person gains wealth
above a certain point the overall level of happiness stays the same.
3.2  A Buddhist Economic View
Happiness, from a Buddhist standpoint, is a feeling (sukha
vedanâ). Also, happiness is conditioned arising between the mind-and-
body (nâma-rûpa) through the DO (Dependent Origination) cycle. So,
happiness in this perspective is transient (anicca), stressful (dukkha), and
not-self (anattâ). Although it embraces a variety of meanings, types, and
grades, it can be given one definition: “A sensory-derived feeling that
arises in regard to the five sensual elements: forms or material shapes,
sounds, smells, tastes, and touches (M II 66)”. Besides, there are three
theoretical doctrines (theories or types) of happiness in Buddhism: Sen-
sual Happiness (kâma-sukha), Happiness of Meditative Absorption
(jhâna-sukha), and Supreme Happiness (nibbâna-sukha). Sensual hap-
piness creates for its seekers (and societies) more dangers than benefits
and lessens economic and social co-operation. However, it is not rejected
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in the Buddhist context, if and only if it produces right-life pursuits in
keeping with the three practical doctrines of happiness __ that is, the Ten-
Bases of Meritorious Action (Dasa-puññakiriyâ-vatthu), the Noble Eight-
fold Path (Ariya-atthangika-magga), and the Four Foundations of Mind-
fulness (Catu-Satipatthâna), which support one another to bring real hap-
piness.
I propose Buddhism as an alternative explanation to the Western
approach to the paradox of happiness. The paradox of sukha (happiness)
in a Buddhist standpoint conveys key insights, truths, and itself contains
small paradoxes. The issue has also enlarged our understanding about
the complexity of happiness, by which I mean sensual (ordinary) happi-
ness (kâma-sukha).
3.2.1  Meaning of the Paradox of Happiness
Following the Buddhist perspective, I define the paradox of hap-
piness as “the situation that the pursuit of happiness is always impos-
sible or incompatible with its attainment for a person without right-view
(seeing the thing as it really is)”.
3.2.2  The Buddhist Explanation of the Paradox of Happiness
The two alternative theories that pertain to the paradox of happi-
ness are applied here: the PMB and the LDO.
The Principle of Nâma-Rûpa or the Mind-and-Body (PMB) in-
vokes an image of men and societies that are obsessed with pursuing
happiness and become entrapped in endless routines of getting more and
spending more due to unlimited want and not seeing the true nature of
happiness: impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, leading them to
unhappiness. The PMB actually carries four small paradoxes which are
axioms of life (or of the world) (M II 261-2). The four are:
1) The world [Life] is unstable, it is swept away
(Upanîyati loko addhuvo).
2) The world [Life] has no shelter, no guard; (Atâno loko
anabhissaro);
3) The world [Life] has nothing of its own, one must go
leaving everything (Assako loko, sabbam pahâya
gamanîyam);
4) The world [Life] is insatiate, incomplete, and the slave
of craving (Ûno loko atitto taahâdâso).
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Axioms 1, 2, and 3 can be summarized through three words:
anicca, dukkha, and anattâ. The Axiom 4 reveals that human beings are
born of craving (tanhâ). Their desires or wants are unlimited. Thus, hap-
piness (or utility in the Western economic sense) which arises from a life
that is unstable, has no protector, and has nothing of its own, has to hold
the ‘same truths’ and it is also made up of ‘desires’. This results in the
marginal utility of income (MUI) to be positive, Ú>0. In other words, the
Fact 1 agrees with the Buddhist PMB. In long run, the pursuit of happi-
ness nearly equals the pursuit of money (or wealth), where its intensity is
due to the extent of ignorance (avijjâ). When people become richer (not
just Americans as shown in Figure 1 and 2), they do not merely pursue a
comfortable life, but pursue conspicuous consumption (e.g., new houses,
new more cars, digital TV, new dresses, etc.). So, rather than building
wealth to increase freedom and a peace of mind as many rich household-
ers, particularly, in the Buddha’s time did, “they go from having one
Ford to having three Lexuses, and nobody is happier”. (Easterlin, cited
in Oswald & Blanchflower 2011: 4). This brings about the paradox, in-
volving the decline of happiness. Thus, the Fact 2 is in agreement with
the Buddhist PMB.
The Law of (Momentary) Dependent Origination (LDO)4 illumi-
nates the condition of people who live in societies that are preoccupied
with money as a measure of well-being; they do not see the nature of
happiness as connected to dependent origination, always ceasing, ulti-
mately empty, and always leading to unhappiness. The gist of DO
(paticcasamuppâda) can be clarified by a chain of 12 links without a
beginning or an end.5 Venerable Ajahn Chah Subhaddo (1918-1992) has
given a fine analogy of ‘falling from a tree’ in his Dhamma Talk, on
January 17, 1969 (B.E. 2512):
It’s in a flash, you’ve fallen all the way from the top of the
tree and hit the ground, and you have no idea how many
branches you passed on the way down. When the mind
experiences a mind-object and is attracted to it, all of a
sudden you find yourself experiencing a good mood with-
out being aware of the causes and conditions which led
up to it ... In reality, there are no signs telling you that
now it’s ignorance, now it’s volitional formations, then
it’s consciousness, now it’s mind-and-body, and so on...
the Buddha analyzed one moment of consciousness… ev-
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erything happens so fast you don’t have time to reckon
how far you’ve fallen and where you are at any given
moment. What you know is that you’ve hit the ground
with a thud, and it hurts! (Subhaddo 1969: 335).
In the Mahânidâna Sutta, the Buddha shows that happiness de-
rived from the six-sense bases are contextual or causally conditioned in
which ignorance (avijjâ), or craving (tanhâ), is involved (D II 50-70).
This spiritual problem (craving or greed), where its related ideas such as
self-interest, unlimited want, demand, choices, or desire, are now ac-
cepted as ‘natural’. Yet, it is hard to deny that the mainstream economic
philosophy not only requires but promotes greed through competition,
resulting in the more pursuit, the richer and the happier. Thus, Fact 1 is
correct, it agrees to the LDO.
In the same Sutta, the Buddha explains that craving also condi-
tions seeking or pursuing. The process of DO operates externally at the
macro-level, manifesting the social and economic ills (D II 55-8). Sev-
eral teachings such as the Aggañña Sutta (D III 77-94), Cakkavatti-
Sîhanâda Sutta (D III 59-76), Vâsettha Sutta (M II 379-85), and
Mahâdukkhakkhanda Sutta (M I 110-9), __ explain the implications of
ignorance or craving as resulting in social and economic problems, espe-
cially poverty and inequality of distribution of wealth in a society. To the
Buddha, “Poverty is a woeful thing for a worldly wanton. It is miserable
because it leads to borrowing, mounting debts, and ever-increasing suf-
fering (A III 249-50)”. This implies that the pursuit of happiness (with-
out wisdom of self-limitation), in long run, cannot lead people to the
greatest happiness, but only to societal suffering and ecological catastro-
phe. This is, indeed, the paradox of happiness.
In sum, ordinary people desire to possess, desire to be, desire not
to possess, desire not to be, all of which only serve to produce dissatis-
faction or suffering (dukkha); suffering which is not always obvious, but
concealed. The momentary DO implies that the paradox of happiness
always happens inside our minds, but hidden in our feeling__that is in our
mind, “Whatever happiness and pleasure arises dependent on the body,…
feelings…on consciousness__this is the satisfaction in them. Whatever
there is of impermanence, changeability, pain, and confusion on account
thereof-this is the misery and unsatisfactoriness inherent in the body and
the mind (S III 24-5)”.
The LDO also indicates four conclusions about happiness: 1) it
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is an impermanent and conditioned occurrence, 2) It flows and changes
with no-self or me-and-mine found in the mind, 3) it always ends its
revolution with dukkha, and 4) it is paradoxical at every moment of mind
but we cannot see it as it really is due to our ignorance or craving. To
escape the paradox of happiness is only through following the correct
practice or virtuous conduct (along the Noble Eightfold Path). When one
knows and sees the truth of happiness (which is impermanent and para-
doxical); ignorance-based clinging vanishes; desires have no means of
arising; and suffering ceases.
Now is the time to awaken together, set a common ground of
understanding happiness as a complex conception and the paradox of
happiness with a moral language, as well as often nourish our minds
with peace. Only thus can happiness be truly achieved.
ABBREVIATIONS
1.  Pali Texts and Translations:
A = Anguttara-nikâya, for example,
A III 249-50. = Anguttara-nikâya, vol. 3, pp. 249-50.
of Hare, E.M. (tr.). Anguttara-nikâya: The Gradual
Sayings. vol. 3 (The Book of The Fives and Sixes).
(no. 20). Oxford: PTS, 1995.
D = Dîgha-nikâya, for example,
D II 55-8 = Dîgha-nikâya, vol. 2, pp. 55-8.
of  Rhys Davids, T.W. and C.A.F. (trs.). Dîgha-nikâya:
Dialogues of the Buddha. 4th ed. (no. 8). Oxford: Pali
Text Society, 1995.
M = Majjhima-nikâya, for example,
M II 261-2 = Majjhima-nikâya, vol. 2, pp. 261-2.
of Horner, I.B. (tr.). Majjhima-nikâya: The Middle
Length Sayings. (no. 11). Oxford: Pali Text Society,
1994.
S = Samyutta-nikâya, for example,
S III 24-5 = Samyutta-nikâya, vol. 3 (Khandhâ Vagga), pp.24-5.
of Woodward, F.L. (tr.). Samyutta-nikâya: Book of
Kindred Sayings. (no. 15). Oxford: PTS, 1995.
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2.  Ancient Books:
Eu = Euthydemus (by Plato), for example,
Eu III.278e = Euthydemus. vol. 3, sec. 278e, of Plato in Twelve
Volumes. tr. by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1967. [online]. available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+
euthyd.+271a [30 August 2011].
Le = Leviathan (by Hobbes), for example,
Le I.11.1 = Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Part. 1, Chapter 11,
paragraph 1.
of eBook@Adelaide. South Australia: The University
of Adelaide, (1651) 2007. [online]. available at http:
//ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/ [25
February 2012].
NE = Nicomachean Ethics (by Aristotle), for example,
NE X.7/284-7 = Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, Chapter 7, pp.284-7.
tr. by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub-
lishing Co., 1985.
DO Dependent Origination (Paticcasamuppâda)
Endnotes
1David Hume, the skeptic and empiricist, is a Scottish philosopher known for
his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. He introduced the term 'utility' into the
moral vocabulary, and his theory was the immediate forerunner to the classic utilitar-
ian view of J. Bentham and J.S. Mill.
2“Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques" Paris, 1727 - Paris, 1781, [online], available
at http://www.memo.fr/en/article.aspx?ID=PER_MOD_168 [26 January 2012].
3‘Keeping with the Joneses’, an idiom and one of the tenets of consumerism,
refers to people living beyond their means and trying to keep up with their better-off
neighbours.
4Owing to the Sammohavinodanî, the Commentary on the Vibhaga, presents
DO in two ways: 1) in terms of kamma (volitional activities) that takes place in the
‘cycle of births and deaths’ (samsâra) of the men or in a three-lifetime basis (the past,
present, and future)__an orthodox explanation called as the Suttanta-bhâjanîyanaya;
and 2) in terms of events happening in everyday life within a moment of mind, an
alternative explanation called as the Abhidhamma-bhâjanîyanaya.4 This article ap-
plies DO of the latter explanation, although the former more common Pa?iccasamupp?da
because of its more complete documentation.
5The 12 links are, namely, 1) Avijjâ: ignorance, 2) Sankhârâ: volitional for-
mations, 3) Viññâa: consciousness, 4) Nâma-rûpa: mind-and-body, 5) Salâyatana:
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six sense-bases, 6) Phassa: contact, 7) Vedanâ: feeling, 8) Taahâ: craving, 9) Upâdâna:
clinging, attachment, 10) Bhava: becoming, 11) Jâti: birth, and 12) Jarâ-marana:
aging-and-death.(D II 50-1).
The cycle of DO may begin with other steps; it does not necessarily start from
the first. Besides, all the mental states (contact, feeling, etc.) are coexistent. They arise
in one conscious moment; there is no reason for the sequence (Nârada: 83).
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